Overview: In this article we address the issues with the traditional understanding of the rabbinic derivation tools, midot shehatorah nidreshet bahen in Heb., and present a new approach to the rabbinic methods of interpreting Scripture.
The classical approach to the Derivation Tools or Rabbinic Interpretation of Scripture (midot shehatorah nidreshet bahen in Talmudic lingo) is simple and easy. The contemporary Orthodox perspective is that these derivation tools are a gift from Moses to us at Sinai and are applied by the sages. This view would argue that while some of these tools aren’t logical, still the sages apply them since that’s how God wants them to interpret His Torah. He told them how to interpret the verses at Sinai along with the Oral Law He gave them.
This may seem smooth at first glance, but there are many reasons and perhaps evidence to re-approach this broad concept and rationalize it, taking a new perspective on rabbinic interpretation of Scripture. This approach, in short, is that these derivation tools are all logical and were not necessarily given to us at Sinai.
The following article is intended for those somewhat familiar with Talmudic style of learning and the methods of rabbinic interpretation. For a simple understanding of the derivation tools, see “Rabbinic Interpretation of Scripture.” The focus of this article is to demonstrate the rationale behind the derivation tools and explain the ones that seem irrational. Being that they are rational methods of interpretation, there’s no reason to suggest that these derivation tools were specifically from Moses at Sinai.
Issues with the traditional understanding
Let’s start off with pointing out that nowhere in the Talmud does it say that these derivation tools are given from Moses at Sinai. In fact, the many arguments on the methods of interpretation[1] would indicate that these methods are indeed not from Sinai. As pointed out by Maimonides,[i] it isn’t possible for there to be arguments on concepts or laws that were passed on from Moses at Sinai.[2] See “Laws from Moses at Sinai” for more on that subject.
Another obvious issue with this concept of “divinely ordained” derivation tools is that it would seem like a weird game. The concept of yitur is a good example. The simple understanding of this derivation tool is that God added “extra” words into the verse in order that laws be learned from it. But an obvious issue with this concept is that the sages would have no clue which law to imply from the extra wording.
Another obvious issue with this is that in actuality, the “extra” wording in most cases isn’t actually “extra” wording. It is usually just a more elaborative form of writing in order to clarify its meaning. It’s written just as anyone would write a sentence. It is ridiculous to assume that there are hidden meanings in these words that are innocently written as anyone would write a sentence. Thus there’s no reason to imply that God had a secret intention in the verse.[3]
Furthermore, whenever the yitur is used, it is always used to imply a law that is logical. Therefore we could assume that the law would either way have been implemented by the rabbinic authority. If so, why would there be the need for the yitur?[4]
Issues with the gezera shava
Besides for the yitur, another example of a derivation tool that seems illogical is the gezera shava. In short, this method of interpretation is that if a law or detail is missing from one Mitzvah, we can attach that missing law from another Mitzvah in which the law or detail isn’t missing. They are compared by means of both of the Mitzvos sharing an “identical word.”
The issues with this derivation tool are obvious. Just because two Mitzvos share a common word doesn’t mean that they are identical and are to be learned one from the other. I sure hope that when reading this book you are not comparing sentences based on a common word they both share. That’s just not a normal way to read a sentence.[5]
Some Talmudic scholars suggest that the “common words” being interpreted are from Sinai. Meaning to say that Moses told us at Sinai that these words are to be interpreted via the gezera shava method of interpretation, without telling us what the law to be interpreted actually is.
But there are many obvious issues with this. First of all, there are disputes in the Talmud regarding the use of a gezera shava, implying that they are not from Sinai. Laws from Sinai are indisputable as mentioned earlier. In addition, the very definition of the gezera shava method of interpretation is disputed. Some say that the “common word” used for the gezera shava must be “opened” on both sides. This means that the word must be “extra” on both ends, by both the Mitzvah that is being learned from and the Mitzvah being learned to. Another opinion is that it just needs to be “extra” on one end. And a third opinion is that it doesn’t have to be open at all. From the fact that this derivation tool is disputed shows that it probably is not from Sinai.
Furthermore, according to the first and second opinion that the “common word” must be “extra” (either on one end or on both) yet another question arises. If these “common words” were given to us at Sinai by Moses, why then are there rules which “words” can be interpreted?[6]
Moreover, this concept seems like a strange game. If Moses would tell us the “words” that are to be interpreted via the gezera shava, why couldn’t he just tell us the actual law that is to be learned from it?
Many firmly believe the gezera shava to be from Moses at Sinai because of a rule stated in the Talmud multiple times. The rule is that a sage may not interpret a verse via the gezera shava on his own accord; rather he must have received the gezera shava in tradition from his teachers.[ii] Now, the traditional understanding of this is that the gezera shava must come from his teachers who received it from their teachers up until Moses at Sinai. But this doesn’t have to be the case. As we shall soon explain, the rule that it must come from hid teachers, doesn’t mean from his teachers all the way back to Sinai but rather all the way back to the times the Sanhedrin stood.
The solution
These are from the main issues surrounding the traditional understanding of the derivation tools. The evidence pieced together earlier all seem to suggest that the derivation tools are not from Sinai but are rather logical methods of interpretation. We still need to explain the yitur and gezera shava and we shall do so shortly. But before that let’s visit the topic of logical interpretations of the verses.
You see, the Written Torah gives us only a general picture of some of the Mitzvos. Many of its details are left open for discussion, being absent from the text. The authority was given to the sages to fill in the blanks.[7] In some cases they were able to determine the details by logically analyzing the text and comparing it other verses. These means of analyzing and interpreting are what we call the derivation tools. In other cases, analyzing the text wasn’t sufficient to determine the details and they would need to use their own logic to conclude the missing details. This is similar to the United States Supreme Court whose job is to logically interpret and apply the laws of the Constitution and its Amendments. The Constitution on its own doesn’t address every detail but rather left them for later generations’ Supreme Court to address.
Now, when the missing law was filled in by the rabbis, they did so by two means as mentioned earlier. The first way was to analyze the text and/or compare it to other verses and discover what the Torah’s intention is for that apparent missing detail. The second way they filled in the missing details, was by using their own logic and deciding what makes most sense in that case not addressed in the Torah’s text.
The first method is done with the main bulk of the derivation tools. But the second way wasn’t expounded from the text, rather from logic. Yet they still connected it to the verse by means of a yitur or a similar method of interpretation. Every time the method of interpretation seems illogical, it is likely that the interpretation isn’t the actual way they concluded the law. Rather it was concluded that logically the law should be so and so. Only afterwards did they connect it to the verse. It is similar to the concept of asmachta addressed at length in “What’s Up With the Far-Fetched Interpretations.” See that chapter for a better understanding of what we are saying here.
Asmachta vs. yitur
The only difference between the asmachta and the yitur is that the yitur (or a similar illogical method of interpretation) is that the asmachta is usually referring to a rabbinic law that is associated with the verse by means of asmachta. Whereas here, the law is much more biblical than rabbinic being that it is there to fill in a missing detail absent in the biblical Mitzvah.
Why did they find the need to associate the law with the text if it was a product of logic and not the method of interpretation of yitur as they present it?
While from the Talmud itself it is not clear, here are three possible explanations:
(1) Because it was prohibited to write the Oral Law at that time, this was used as a method to help recall what the teacher taught in class. Whenever the student would now go through the Written Torah, he would remember the “hints” in the words and recall the oral tradition.[iii]
(2) The twisting of the words is “different” and even “cute” in a sense. This would help the students pay attention in class and to remember it for the future. This custom is actually still commonly practiced by rabbis nowadays. It is known in Yiddish as vertelach.
(3) It was done to convince the simple uneducated populace, at least sub-consciously, that these laws are of biblical origins in order that they respect and adhere to them properly.[iv] The fact is that these laws are biblically-binding being that it derived by the sages’ logic to fill in the missing detail of a biblical Mitzvah. Yet some might come to think that these aren’t authoritative being that they are not written in the text. Therefore, the sages used the yitur to give the impression that these laws are actually from the text itself. Apparently, this worked well since nowadays the vast-majority of Orthodox Jews believe that the Written Torah specifically alluded to this law by adding an “extra” word.
Some traditional Orthodox believers might brush this away as apologetic and would say that the sages wouldn’t interpret the text if it weren’t truly the way they were learning the law from. But I would like to remind them that this concept is highly recognized by asmachta as explained in “What’s Up With the Far-Fetched Interpretations.” Over here, we are simply applying this concept a step further in order to answer the many questions there are on the traditional understanding of the derivation tools.
Furthermore, this concept is seen beyond rabbinic asmachtas and can be found by biblical laws as well. The prohibited labors of Shabbat are a tradition from Moses at Sinai. The verse prohibits “working on the Sabbath” without clarifying what “work” consists of. The consensus is that these laws are from Sinai passed down to us via the Oral Law.[v] Yet the Talmud found an interesting way to associate these 39 forbidden labors to the text of the verse, even though it is so clear that the text isn’t alluding to the 39 labors by the way that the rabbis interpret it. We won’t get into this long discussion but see Talmud Yerushalmi Shabbat 87:2 for further understanding. From there it is clear that the method of interpreting the verse isn’t the way the we know of the 39 forbidden labors but rather is a post-facto association once we already know of the law by other means (in this case via a tradition from Moses at Sinai).
Similarly, see Sukkah 35a regarding the Esrog we shake with the Lulav on Sukkos. The consensus is that the meaning of the “nice fruit” discussed in the verse is the Esrog and is known to us by a tradition from Moses at Sinai.[vi] Yet the Talmud brings multiple rather interesting ways to learn from the text of the verse itself that the “nice fruit” means the Esrog. It is clear that those methods of interpretation aren’t actually the way we learn out that the verse means an Esrog. Rather the methods of interpretation are post-facto associations. After we already know that it means an Esrog, the sages decided to connect it to the verse’s text.
All this demonstrates that the sages would frequently interpret the verse’s text and deduce a law from it, even though the law isn’t actually derived from that method of interpretation. The interpretation was only a way to connect this law to the verse, and they did so for the reasons discussed earlier. Therefore, we can suggest that whenever the method of interpretation isn’t a logical one, that it wasn’t the actual source for the law but a post-facto association to the verse. [This explains why the laws learned out of a yitur are always logical laws that would probably be applied even without the “extra” word.][8]
The gezera shava solution
Having explained the yitur, now let’s move on to the gezera shava.
The gezera shava is by all means the most difficult of the derivation tools to understand, if we stick to the traditional way of understanding the derivation tools. Much confusion surrounds the concept of gezera shava as scores of Talmudic commentators each give their own approach to various aspects on the characteristic of this perplexing derivation tool (see Encyclopedia Talmudis on gezera shava). It seems odd that we can connect two concepts together just on the basis of them sharing a common word, usually by chance. In my humble opinion, many Talmudic commentators (such as Tosfos in Shabbat 96b) fail in their attempt to sort together and rationalize the idea of a gezera shava.
Here’s my humble understanding of the gezera shava.[9] The Torah is often silent on some key details or key aspects to a specific Mitzvah that it only mentions briefly. The job of the sages is to “figure out” what the law there is. They do so by means of the derivation tools. One very rational approach to “figure out” what the law by a specific Mitzvah which the Torah doesn’t clarify, is to look at a similar context which does mention the law for that detail. We then can compare the cases and conclude that the law should apply in the Mitzvah at-question as well (due to lack of a better option).
The comparison between the two concepts by means of the “common word” is not the reason we learn one from the other. We learn one from the other because in concept the two Mitzvos are comparable. The “common word” is merely an asmachta/hint. It was used for the reasons discussed above of why the yitur was used.[10]
Now, this rational method of interpretation is a little risky. Although it would usually seem that we can compare cases that share the same theme and learn laws one from the other, not always would it make sense to do so. Sometimes we can assert that the law was specifically said in this case and not the other because it should only apply by this Mitzvah and not by the other Mitzvah. Therefore there would be many arguments on the gezera shava and the Sanhedrin would argue it out and vote for a verdict. Due to the complexity of this sensitive gezera shava method of interpretation, the Talmudic sages limited its use. They said that only if a sage received this gezera shava in tradition from the Sanhedrin (not from Sinai, as many understand it) can they use this gezera shava. In this way we are assured that the gezera shava wasn’t improperly applied.
In conclusion, there’s no reason to say the novel idea that we are to learn laws from illogical methods of interpretation. Rather the rabbinic methods of interpretation all make sense, and the ones that seem to be illogical, like the yitur and gezera shava, we have explained at length.
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[1] See Niddah 22b-23a regarding the three-way argument on whether or not gezera shava needs to be “open” words. See Makkot 12a regarding the dispute of whether Torah speaks in human language or not. See Sanhedrin 45b-46a on the argument of how to interpret the verse when it brings a general then particular (kelal uperat). And these are just some examples.
[2] According to Chavas Yair 192 it is possible in rare cases for there to be disputes on laws from Sinai, being that some of the laws were forgotten from the oral tradition over the years.
[3] An example of such would be from Chagigah 4a in which the term “all your males”, said about the command of pilgrimage to the Temple, is used to exclude an individual of undetermined sex and a hermaphrodite from the requirement of the Mitzvah. These people, the rabbis concluded, are not required to travel to Jerusalem for the holidays. The conclusion is purely logical since these people are not regarded as males in Jewish law. Yet for some reason it was derived from the “extra wording” in the verse (which allegedly could have said “males,” without the two extra words of “all” and “your”). Now, it is clear that proper lingo would be to phrase the verse just as the verse did, yet the exegesis is based on the fact that it’s “extra wording.” Furthermore, yet another issue with this interpretation of the verse is that the wording could in fact determine the opposite to be true – “all your males” would come to include all potential males, these people included. Thus the verse would come to include peoples of undetermined sex and hermaphrodites in the Mitzvah of pilgrimage. [See for example Mishnah Berachos 1:5 where the word “all” is used to include, not exclude.]
Thus from this example we see two things:
(1) The words aren’t actually “extra.”
(2) Two laws could have been learned out of the “extra” wording, yet the rabbis chose the one that fits their understanding of these genders in regard to Jewish law. This seems to suggest that the law wasn’t actually derived from the wording of the verse but rather out of logic. Therefore the law would have been applied even if there weren’t these “extra” words in the verse.
We will answer these issues later on with our new approach to rabbinic interpretation.
[4] Some might suggest that even though without the yitur the law would have still been implemented, it wouldn’t be regarded as “biblical” but as “rabbinic.” Rabbinic laws have different rules and are more lenient. But the issue with this suggestion is that we are making a law biblical just because of an “extra wording.” How can we be sure that this is the law God had in mind with His writing of this extra word in His Torah? Maybe He had a different law in mind that the sages missed?
[5] One might argue that the Book of God is holy and therefore we can learn one Mitzvah from another based on the fact that they share a common word. But this answer doesn’t make this derivation tool any more logical. God wrote the Torah (i.e. had others like Moses write it for Him) in order for us to read and understand His Mitzvos. He did so by writing the Torah in a way that it’s comprehensible to humans; and He did so by writing it in a language which is a form of communication for humans. Now, some Mitzvos needed a word to be said in the verse in order to understand the Mitzvah. So how can we take that innocent word and compare it to another Mitzvah in which the same word is used and learn one from the other on that basis? It is clear that the word was used just to explain the Mitzvah, not to be used to compare it to another Mitzvah.
According to some opinions the word has to be “extra” in order to be used. But according to others, the word doesn’t have to be extra. Our question is mainly according to the latter opinion. But even according to the first opinion, these words are hardly “extra” as seen in the many examples of gezera shava brought in the Talmud.
Thus we have no reason to use this innocent word for illogical interpretations.
[6] To answer this question, plus some other questions, Rabeinu Tam in Tosfos (Shabbat 96b) suggests an answer that shows just how problematic the gezera shavah concept is. Tosfos suggests that at Sinai, Moses gave the sages the number of times the gezera shava may be used. In this regard, Tosfos says, the gezera shava is from Sinai.
The problems with this suggestion are obvious. For starters, why would Moses give a “number of times” the gezera shava can be used? Either it’s a valid method of interpretation or not! This is besides for the previous issues we raised about the common understanding of gezera shava.
[7] We can assume that the authority was given to them at Sinai. But even if it wasn’t it is logical to have a central point of authority to decide on uncertain matters. If there were no authority, then each man would do as his heart desires and religion would become obsolete. Obviously, this authority would be the wisest of the people and the most God-fearing. This is what we call the sages or rabbis. Modern “rabbis,” such as leaders in the Reform movement and other denominations that care more about modernization than about religion cannot be regarded as authoritative in the religious arena.
[8] Many people claim that the question of whether or not the derivation tools are rational or not is subject to debate between two great Tanaaic sages, Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akivah. They’ll say that Rabbi Yishmael is of the rationale camp and Rabbi Akivah of the camp that uses illogical tools to learn from the verses. They base this theory primarily on the famous dispute between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akivah whether or not dibra torah kilshon bnei adam. That is the Talmudic lingo for the concept that when Torah uses a double-expression whether or not the “extra” word is subject to interpterion (the opinion of Rabbi Akiva) or whether the double-expression is not considered “extra” but is merely the way that humans speak (the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael). Ancient Hebrew, back in the days, would frequently double certain terms, something which the Torah does as well. Thus Rabbi Akivah would interpret the extra word via the yitur method of interpretation and Rabbi Yishmael would disregard that interpretation. This is the basis for the theory that Rabbi Yishmael would interpret Torah rationally and Rabbi Akivah irrationally.
But I beg to differ. There’s no reason to say that Rabbi Akivah would interpret Torah irrationally. Based on the evidence brought earlier, it would be ridiculous to play games with the Torah’s wording and interpret laws based on those interpretations. Rather it is clear, as explained, that even according to Rabbi Akiva, the yitur method of interpretation was only to be used after the law was already derived via logic. The dispute between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akivah was merely a way of masking the fact that Rabbi Yishmael disputed Rabbi Akivah’s rule logically and the Talmud displays it as if it were derived from the verses words for the reasons discussed earlier.
Perhaps evidence for this can be found in Talmud Berachos 31b where Rabbi Akivah uses the concept that dibra torah kilshon bnei adam to defend his position! Thus we see that these methods of interpretation (and their counters such as dibra torah kilshon bneu adam) were used merely as a masking for the real logical dispute behind the matter. Thus in some places Rabbi Akivah can use the concept of dibra torah kilshon bnei adam and in some places not, since either way that is not the real source for his rulings.
There’s a Midrashic story brought in Talmud Menachot 29b, among other places, involving Moses at Sinai and Rabbi Akivah. When Moses ascended the heavens for 40 days prior the Giving of the Ten Commandments at Mt. Sinai, the Midrash says that he went to the heavenly realms where the future great sages were learning Torah. He noticed Rabbi Akivah interpreting the Torah and adding laws based on the “crowns” found on the letters. [In the Torah scrolls read in the synagogue there are small “crowns” atop many of the letters.] Moses was so impressed and asked God that the Torah be given through this great sage, Rabbi Akivah. God responded to Moses telling him to listen carefully to the discussion in the study-hall of Rabbi Akivah. Moses listens and hears the students of Rabbi Akivah asking him how he knows which Halachos to interpret from these crowns. Rabbi Akivah responded that these laws are from tradition from Moses at Sinai. When Moses heard this, he was satisfied and was ready to give the Torah to the Jews.
That is the famous Midrashic story. If we pay attention to the story, we can learn an important lesson from it. We realize that although Rabbi Akivah was learning laws from the “crowns” atop the letters, he admitted that these laws are in fact a tradition from Moses at Sinai and these “interpretations” were merely post-facto associations (asmachtas/hints). We thus see that even in Rabbi Akivah’s methodology of interpreting the Torah “irrationally,” he only means to do so after he already knows the law from another source, either by logic or by a tradition from Moses at Sinai.
[9] For a similar understanding of gezera shava see kinaas soferim on Maimonides’ sefer hamitzvos shoresh beis.
[10] The argument discussed earlier whether or not the words must be “open” or “extra” can be explained as follows. Because one of the reasons for the asmachta was in order to give the public the impression that these laws are biblical, some sages found the need for the gezera shava to be “extra” in order for it to actually seem as the verse was alluding to the law. If the “common word” weren’t extra, then the public wouldn’t see how the verse is alluding to the law derived from the gezera shava.
[i] Hilchos Mamrim 1:3.
[ii] Niddah 19b.
[iii] Torah Temimah 31:19:4, Kuzzari 3:73, and Rambam in his introduction to the Mishnayos chapter 4.
[iv] See Encyclopedia Talmudis on “asmachta”; Maharil in Likkutim. Also see Mavo Letalmud, Midrashei Talmud ch. 1 (page 24).
[v] See Talmud Shabbat 73.
[vi] See Maimonides introduction to the Mishanayos.
