Re-approaching Rabbinic Interpretation

Overview: In this article we address the issues with the traditional understanding of the rabbinic derivation tools, midot shehatorah nidreshet bahen in Heb., and present a new approach to the rabbinic methods of interpreting Scripture.

The classical approach to the Derivation Tools or Rabbinic Interpretation of Scripture (midot shehatorah nidreshet bahen in Talmudic lingo) is simple and easy. The contemporary Orthodox perspective is that these derivation tools are a gift from Moses to us at Sinai and are applied by the sages. This view would argue that while some of these tools aren’t logical, still the sages apply them since that’s how God wants them to interpret His Torah. He told them how to interpret the verses at Sinai along with the Oral Law He gave them.

This may seem smooth at first glance, but there are many reasons and perhaps evidence to re-approach this broad concept and rationalize it, taking a new perspective on rabbinic interpretation of Scripture. This approach, in short, is that these derivation tools are all logical and were not necessarily given to us at Sinai.

The following article is intended for those somewhat familiar with Talmudic style of learning and the methods of rabbinic interpretation. For a simple understanding of the derivation tools, see “Rabbinic Interpretation of Scripture.” The focus of this article is to demonstrate the rationale behind the derivation tools and explain the ones that seem irrational. Being that they are rational methods of interpretation, there’s no reason to suggest that these derivation tools were specifically from Moses at Sinai.

Issues with the traditional understanding

Let’s start off with pointing out that nowhere in the Talmud does it say that these derivation tools are given from Moses at Sinai. In fact, the many arguments on the methods of interpretation^[1] would indicate that these methods are indeed not from Sinai. As pointed out by Maimonides,^[i] it isn’t possible for there to be arguments on concepts or laws that were passed on from Moses at Sinai.^[2] See “Laws from Moses at Sinai” for more on that subject.

Another obvious issue with this concept of “divinely ordained” derivation tools is that it would seem like a weird game. The concept of yitur is a good example. The simple understanding of this derivation tool is that God added “extra” words into the verse in order that laws be learned from it. But an obvious issue with this concept is that the sages would have no clue which law to imply from the extra wording.

Another obvious issue with this is that in actuality, the “extra” wording in most cases isn’t actually “extra” wording. It is usually just a more elaborative form of writing in order to clarify its meaning. It’s written just as anyone would write a sentence. It is ridiculous to assume that there are hidden meanings in these words that are innocently written as anyone would write a sentence. Thus there’s no reason to imply that God had a secret intention in the verse.^[3]

Furthermore, whenever the yitur is used, it is always used to imply a law that is logical. Therefore we could assume that the law would either way have been implemented by the rabbinic authority. If so, why would there be the need for the yitur?^[4]

Issues with the gezera shava

Besides for the yitur, another example of a derivation tool that seems illogical is the gezera shava. In short, this method of interpretation is that if a law or detail is missing from one Mitzvah, we can attach that missing law from another Mitzvah in which the law or detail isn’t missing. They are compared by means of both of the Mitzvos sharing an “identical word.”

The issues with this derivation tool are obvious. Just because two Mitzvos share a common word doesn’t mean that they are identical and are to be learned one from the other. I sure hope that when reading this book you are not comparing sentences based on a common word they both share. That’s just not a normal way to read a sentence.^[5]

Some Talmudic scholars suggest that the “common words” being interpreted are from Sinai. Meaning to say that Moses told us at Sinai that these words are to be interpreted via the gezera shava method of interpretation, without telling us what the law to be interpreted actually is.

But there are many obvious issues with this. First of all, there are disputes in the Talmud regarding the use of a gezera shava, implying that they are not from Sinai. Laws from Sinai are indisputable as mentioned earlier. In addition, the very definition of the gezera shava method of interpretation is disputed. Some say that the “common word” used for the gezera shava must be “opened” on both sides. This means that the word must be “extra” on both ends, by both the Mitzvah that is being learned from and the Mitzvah being learned to. Another opinion is that it just needs to be “extra” on one end. And a third opinion is that it doesn’t have to be open at all. From the fact that this derivation tool is disputed shows that it probably is not from Sinai.

Furthermore, according to the first and second opinion that the “common word” must be “extra” (either on one end or on both) yet another question arises. If these “common words” were given to us at Sinai by Moses, why then are there rules which “words” can be interpreted?^[6]

Moreover, this concept seems like a strange game. If Moses would tell us the “words” that are to be interpreted via the gezera shava, why couldn’t he just tell us the actual law that is to be learned from it?

Many firmly believe the gezera shava to be from Moses at Sinai because of a rule stated in the Talmud multiple times. The rule is that a sage may not interpret a verse via the gezera shava on his own accord; rather he must have received the gezera shava in tradition from his teachers.^[ii] Now, the traditional understanding of this is that the gezera shava must come from his teachers who received it from their teachers up until Moses at Sinai. But this doesn’t have to be the case. As we shall soon explain, the rule that it must come from hid teachers, doesn’t mean from his teachers all the way back to Sinai but rather all the way back to the times the Sanhedrin stood.

The solution

These are from the main issues surrounding the traditional understanding of the derivation tools. The evidence pieced together earlier all seem to suggest that the derivation tools are not from Sinai but are rather logical methods of interpretation. We still need to explain the yitur and gezera shava and we shall do so shortly. But before that let’s visit the topic of logical interpretations of the verses.

You see, the Written Torah gives us only a general picture of some of the Mitzvos. Many of its details are left open for discussion, being absent from the text. The authority was given to the sages to fill in the blanks.^[7] In some cases they were able to determine the details by logically analyzing the text and comparing it other verses. These means of analyzing and interpreting are what we call the derivation tools. In other cases, analyzing the text wasn’t sufficient to determine the details and they would need to use their own logic to conclude the missing details. This is similar to the United States Supreme Court whose job is to logically interpret and apply the laws of the Constitution and its Amendments. The Constitution on its own doesn’t address every detail but rather left them for later generations’ Supreme Court to address.

Now, when the missing law was filled in by the rabbis, they did so by two means as mentioned earlier. The first way was to analyze the text and/or compare it to other verses and discover what the Torah’s intention is for that apparent missing detail. The second way they filled in the missing details, was by using their own logic and deciding what makes most sense in that case not addressed in the Torah’s text.

The first method is done with the main bulk of the derivation tools. But the second way wasn’t expounded from the text, rather from logic. Yet they still connected it to the verse by means of a yitur or a similar method of interpretation. Every time the method of interpretation seems illogical, it is likely that the interpretation isn’t the actual way they concluded the law. Rather it was concluded that logically the law should be so and so. Only afterwards did they connect it to the verse. It is similar to the concept of asmachta addressed at length in “What’s Up With the Far-Fetched Interpretations.” See that chapter for a better understanding of what we are saying here.

Asmachta vs. yitur

The only difference between the asmachta and the yitur is that the yitur (or a similar illogical method of interpretation) is that the asmachta is usually referring to a rabbinic law that is associated with the verse by means of asmachta. Whereas here, the law is much more biblical than rabbinic being that it is there to fill in a missing detail absent in the biblical Mitzvah.

Why did they find the need to associate the law with the text if it was a product of logic and not the method of interpretation of yitur as they present it?

While from the Talmud itself it is not clear, here are three possible explanations:

(1) Because it was prohibited to write the Oral Law at that time, this was used as a method to help recall what the teacher taught in class. Whenever the student would now go through the Written Torah, he would remember the “hints” in the words and recall the oral tradition.^[iii]

(2) The twisting of the words is “different” and even “cute” in a sense. This would help the students pay attention in class and to remember it for the future. This custom is actually still commonly practiced by rabbis nowadays. It is known in Yiddish as vertelach.

(3) It was done to convince the simple uneducated populace, at least sub-consciously, that these laws are of biblical origins in order that they respect and adhere to them properly.^[iv] The fact is that these laws are biblically-binding being that it derived by the sages’ logic to fill in the missing detail of a biblical Mitzvah. Yet some might come to think that these aren’t authoritative being that they are not written in the text. Therefore, the sages used the yitur to give the impression that these laws are actually from the text itself. Apparently, this worked well since nowadays the vast-majority of Orthodox Jews believe that the Written Torah specifically alluded to this law by adding an “extra” word.

Some traditional Orthodox believers might brush this away as apologetic and would say that the sages wouldn’t interpret the text if it weren’t truly the way they were learning the law from. But I would like to remind them that this concept is highly recognized by asmachta as explained in “What’s Up With the Far-Fetched Interpretations.” Over here, we are simply applying this concept a step further in order to answer the many questions there are on the traditional understanding of the derivation tools.

Furthermore, this concept is seen beyond rabbinic asmachtas and can be found by biblical laws as well. The prohibited labors of Shabbat are a tradition from Moses at Sinai. The verse prohibits “working on the Sabbath” without clarifying what “work” consists of. The consensus is that these laws are from Sinai passed down to us via the Oral Law.^[v] Yet the Talmud found an interesting way to associate these 39 forbidden labors to the text of the verse, even though it is so clear that the text isn’t alluding to the 39 labors by the way that the rabbis interpret it. We won’t get into this long discussion but see Talmud Yerushalmi Shabbat 87:2 for further understanding. From there it is clear that the method of interpreting the verse isn’t the way the we know of the 39 forbidden labors but rather is a post-facto association once we already know of the law by other means (in this case via a tradition from Moses at Sinai).

Similarly, see Sukkah 35a regarding the Esrog we shake with the Lulav on Sukkos. The consensus is that the meaning of the “nice fruit” discussed in the verse is the Esrog and is known to us by a tradition from Moses at Sinai.^[vi] Yet the Talmud brings multiple rather interesting ways to learn from the text of the verse itself that the “nice fruit” means the Esrog. It is clear that those methods of interpretation aren’t actually the way we learn out that the verse means an Esrog. Rather the methods of interpretation are post-facto associations. After we already know that it means an Esrog, the sages decided to connect it to the verse’s text.

All this demonstrates that the sages would frequently interpret the verse’s text and deduce a law from it, even though the law isn’t actually derived from that method of interpretation. The interpretation was only a way to connect this law to the verse, and they did so for the reasons discussed earlier. Therefore, we can suggest that whenever the method of interpretation isn’t a logical one, that it wasn’t the actual source for the law but a post-facto association to the verse. [This explains why the laws learned out of a yitur are always logical laws that would probably be applied even without the “extra” word.]^[8]

The gezera shava solution

Having explained the yitur, now let’s move on to the gezera shava.

The gezera shava is by all means the most difficult of the derivation tools to understand, if we stick to the traditional way of understanding the derivation tools. Much confusion surrounds the concept of gezera shava as scores of Talmudic commentators each give their own approach to various aspects on the characteristic of this perplexing derivation tool (see Encyclopedia Talmudis on gezera shava). It seems odd that we can connect two concepts together just on the basis of them sharing a common word, usually by chance. In my humble opinion, many Talmudic commentators (such as Tosfos in Shabbat 96b) fail in their attempt to sort together and rationalize the idea of a gezera shava.

Here’s my humble understanding of the gezera shava.^[9] The Torah is often silent on some key details or key aspects to a specific Mitzvah that it only mentions briefly. The job of the sages is to “figure out” what the law there is. They do so by means of the derivation tools. One very rational approach to “figure out” what the law by a specific Mitzvah which the Torah doesn’t clarify, is to look at a similar context which does mention the law for that detail. We then can compare the cases and conclude that the law should apply in the Mitzvah at-question as well (due to lack of a better option).

The comparison between the two concepts by means of the “common word” is not the reason we learn one from the other. We learn one from the other because in concept the two Mitzvos are comparable. The “common word” is merely an asmachta/hint. It was used for the reasons discussed above of why the yitur was used.^[10]

Now, this rational method of interpretation is a little risky. Although it would usually seem that we can compare cases that share the same theme and learn laws one from the other, not always would it make sense to do so. Sometimes we can assert that the law was specifically said in this case and not the other because it should only apply by this Mitzvah and not by the other Mitzvah. Therefore there would be many arguments on the gezera shava and the Sanhedrin would argue it out and vote for a verdict. Due to the complexity of this sensitive gezera shava method of interpretation, the Talmudic sages limited its use. They said that only if a sage received this gezera shava in tradition from the Sanhedrin (not from Sinai, as many understand it) can they use this gezera shava. In this way we are assured that the gezera shava wasn’t improperly applied.

In conclusion, there’s no reason to say the novel idea that we are to learn laws from illogical methods of interpretation. Rather the rabbinic methods of interpretation all make sense, and the ones that seem to be illogical, like the yitur and gezera shava, we have explained at length.